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Abstract
We consider the range assignment problem in ad-hoc wireless networks in the context of selﬁsh
agents: A network manager aims to assigning transmission ranges to the stations in order to achieve
strong connectivity of the networkwithin aminimal overall power consumption. Station is not directly
controlled by the manager and may refuse to transmit with a certain transmission range because it
might be costly in terms of power consumption.
We investigate the existence of payment schemes which induce the stations to follow the decisions
of a network manager in computing a range assignment, that is, truthful mechanisms for the range
assignment problem.We provide both positive and negative results on the existence of truthful VCG-
based mechanisms for this NP-hard problem. We prove that (i) in general, every polynomial-time
truthful VCG-based mechanism computes a solution of cost far-off the optimum, unless P= NP and
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(ii) there exists a polynomial-time truthful VCG-based mechanism achieving constant approximation
for practically relevant, still NP-hard versions, i.e., the metric and the well-spread case.
© 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Ad-hocwireless networks offer the possibility of communicatingwithout anyﬁxed infras-
tructure. Indeed, each station is a radio transmitter/receiver and communication between
two stations that are not within their respective transmission ranges can be achieved by
multi-hop transmissions:A set of intermediate stations cooperates with the source node and
forwards the message to its destination. Due to the limited power of the stations, multi-hop
transmissions are, in general, unavoidable. Moreover, they often result into a signiﬁcant
reduction of the overall energy required by the communication. This is accomplished by
suitably varying the transmission ranges of the stations depending on the environmental
conditions and on the relative positions of the stations.
While ad-hoc networks have been adopted in the past as an alternative to classical wired
networks (e.g., whenever the use of wired connection was too expensive or simply impossi-
ble), the availability of low-cost hardware and the ﬂexibility provided by ad-hoc networks
opens new possibilities. In particular, this technology may now be applied to build up com-
munication networks without being dependent on any “external” entity imposing its own
will (e.g., governments, internet providers, private companies).
Unfortunately, the inherent self-organized nature of ad-hoc networks poses new problems
since (i) stations are not under the control of a central authority; (ii) a station transmitting
with a certain range incurs a cost proportional to the energy required and so (iii) stations
may decide to not to follow the “protocol” because it is not convenient.
The impact of the energy consumption issue is twofold:
Social cost: The overall energy required to communicate represents a signiﬁcant factor
in the electromagnetic pollution, resource consumption and, in general, it has a tremendous
impact on the environment. When adopted on a large scale, these factors become a central
issue in the design of ad-hoc networks.
Selﬁsh behavior: Due to the limited battery capacity of mobile devices, each node of the
network aims at transmitting with range as small as possible. Thus, it is not reasonable to
assume an altruistic behavior of the nodes in providing their battery resources to forward
somebody else’s messages.
These two aspects are somewhat in conﬂict with each other. On the one hand, without
cooperation, communication is possible only at very high cost: Every station should be
able to reach all other stations. 3 On the other hand, solutions that optimize the social
cost, expressed as the overall power consumption, are based on cooperation. Resolving this
conﬂict is a key point for the development of ad-hoc wireless networks.
3 Interestingly, this would also result in high cost for the single station.
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As for the social cost, a fundamental problem is how to assign transmission ranges to the
stations so that (i) every station i can reach any other station by using intermediate ones
and (ii) the overall energy is minimized. This optimization problem, usually denoted as the
minimum range assignment problem [14], turns out to be a hard problem because of two
factors (see Section 1.2 for more details):
• The cost for station for transmitting within range R is (proportional to) R, where 1
is a constant depending on the environmental conditions (e.g., in the ideal environment
 = 2) [18].
• If a station i transmits with range R, then it actually broadcasts to all stations within that
range. So, providing a direct connection from i to j also gives a set of connections to
other stations “for free”: Those stations at distance not larger than dist(i, j), where
dist(i, j) denotes the distance between i and j .
In order to compute a feasible solution, we need to know the distances from every station
i to all other stations. These data are privately managed by station i which knows her
position with respect to the other ones (this information is typically obtained by exchanging
messages with the neighbor stations [18]).
Unfortunately, when a network manager 4 asks such private data (i.e., relative distances)
to the stations, the latter may report false values with the hope that the manager assigns
them a smaller transmission range. This is where the selﬁsh behavior of the node owners
plays a crucial role. To avoid this, we aim to design a so calledmechanism, that is, a set P of
payment functionswhich, combinedwith a suitable algorithm that constructs a solution (i.e.,
a range assignment), rewards each station for her expenses in implementing the solution
(i.e., the power corresponding to her transmission range). In particular, we want to achieve
two goals simultaneously:
• Each station maximizes her utility (or proﬁt) when reporting the true costs, where the
utility is computed as payments minus costs; by knowing the mechanism, stations act
rationally and report their true distances. A mechanism satisfying this property is called
truthful (see Section 1.4 for a formal deﬁnition).
• The algorithm used in the mechanism (which determines the cost of each station) com-
putes a “good” solutionprovided that the stations give the correct input (i.e., true distances)
to it.
The aim of this paper is to investigate the existence of feasible approximation truthful
mechanisms for the above range assignment problem, that is, truthful mechanisms that
compute approximate solutions in polynomial-time.
1.1. The model
1.1.1. Range assignments and power consumption
LetS be the set of stations.The range one has to assign to a station i is uniquely determined
by the set of connections Ei ⊆ {i} × S that i has to guarantee. Hence, a range assignment
can be represented by the set E = ∪iEi of all connections that must be maintained in the
4 Throughout the paperwe use the term ‘networkmanager’to denote any protocol computing a range assignment.
Thus, a ‘network manager’ should not be confused with a central authority somehow directly controlling the
network resources.
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network. The graph G(S,E) is called the communication graph. For the sake of brevity,
since S is ﬁxed, we will denoteG(S,E) simply asE. Clearly the setO of feasible solutions
depends on the property we require for E.
The deﬁnition of the cost of station i to establish the connections in Ei in the wireless
network model is different from that in any wired network model. In the latter, this cost is
proportional to the sum of the costs of all connections in Ei while, in a wireless network,
the connections in Ei can be established by means of a single transmission performed
with power sufﬁcient to reach the farthest recipient in Ei . The cost of this transmission is
determined by the power with which i has to send the message. LetCij be the cost of station
i to send a message with (minimal) power sufﬁcient to reach j .
We assume that the range assignment is chosen by a network manager. In order to choose
a low-cost solution, the manager needs information about the cost of the connections. So,
in the ﬁrst phase, every station i sends her cost vector Ci = 〈Ci1, . . . , Cin〉 to the manager.
Let C = 〈C1, . . . , Cn〉 be the n2-vector containing all the connection costs. In the second
phase, the manager, based on C, computes a suitable range assignment E ∈ O and asks
station i to transmit messages with power sufﬁcient to maintain Ei .
The cost of station i for maintaining the communication graph E, denoted by costi ,
is thus
costi (Ci, E) := max
j : (i,j)∈E C
i
j .
Hence, the total cost of the range assignment E is
cost(C, E) = ∑
i∈S
costi (Ci, E). (1)
Assigning transmission ranges to stations that (i) guarantee a required connectivity property
between stations and (ii) minimize the overall power consumption (i.e., the total cost) of
the network gives rise to interesting algorithmic questions. In particular, these two aspects
yield a class of fundamental optimization problems, denoted as range assignment problems,
which has been the subject of several recent works in wireless network theory [14,10,6].
In this paper we consider one of themost studied connectivity property: Strong connectiv-
ity (SC). It is thus required that the communication graph induced by the range assignment
is strongly connected. This allows all-to-all communication. Optimal solutions of the re-
sulting range assignment problem, denoted as Min-Range(SC), are minimal cost range
assignments whose induced communication graph is strongly connected.
1.1.2. Selﬁshly-acting stations
We consider each station as a selﬁshly acting agent that privately knows part of the input:
Station i privately knows Ci that the manager must use for the computation of a feasible
solution. To stress that the agent declarations might deviate from the true cost vectors Ci ,
we shall denote them by Di .
A mechanism for Min-Range(SC) is a pair (ALG, P ), where ALG is an algorithm
that, on input D = {D1, . . . , Dn}, returns a feasible range assignment E = ALG(D) and
P = P(D, E) is the payment vector. Hence, agents, being selﬁsh, will try to maximize
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their utility
Ui = P i(D, E)− costi (Ci, E), i = 1, . . . , n.
We require the mechanism to guarantee, for every agent i, the existence of a so called dom-
inant strategy, that is, a strategy i such that, for every possible choice of the other agents,
agent i maximizes her utility by following strategy i . In this case the mechanism is an
implementation with dominant strategies. Otherwise, if we only require that the mechanism
guarantees the existence of strategies 1, . . . , n for all agents 1, . . . , n such that any agent
i maximize her utility by following i in the case every other agent j follows j (Nash
equilibrium strategy) we say that the mechanism is a implementation with Nash strategies.
Implementations with dominant strategies are thus stronger than those with Nash strate-
gies. A dominant strategy remains the best strategy no matter what the other agents do (in
particular, also when some agent does not act rationally). Furthermore, the latter are often
impractical from a computational point of view. In fact implementation with Nash strategies
require that agents achieve a Nash equilibrium and computing a Nash equilibrium is “amost
fundamental computational problem whose complexity is wide open” [19].
A mechanism is truthful with respect to dominant strategies (to Nash equilibrium strate-
gies) if declaring the truth (i.e., Di = Ci) is a dominant strategy (a Nash equilibrium).
Though nontruthful implementations with dominant strategies (Nash equilibrium strate-
gies) are possible, Gibbard [11] proved that, if there exists, for a given problem, an imple-
mentation with dominant strategies (with Nash equilibrium strategies), then there exists a
truthful implementation with dominant strategies (with Nash equilibrium strategies).
For the above reasons we concentrate on mechanisms that are implementations with
truthful dominant strategies, from now on simply truthful mechanisms.
1.2. Previous related works
In this section we review the main previous results on assignment problems and some
fundamental results on algorithmic mechanism design.
1.2.1. Range assignment problems
The Min-Range(SC) problem is known to be NP-hard even when the connection cost
vector C yields an Euclidean 2-dimensional space (e.g., when stations are located on the
plane and  = 1) [7,14]. On the other hand, Min-Range(SC) admits a polynomial-
time 2-approximation algorithm [14]. Finally, the problem is polynomially solvable when
stations are located on the line (i.e., linear radio networks) [14]. For further results on other
versions of the range assignment problem, we refer the reader to [6].
1.2.2. (Algorithmic) Mechanism design
1.2.2.1. Truthful VCG mechanisms. The theory of mechanism design dates back to the
seminal papers by Vickrey [21], Clarke [3] and Groves [12]. Their celebrated VCG mecha-
nism is still the prominent technique to derive truthful mechanisms for many problems (e.g.,
shortest path, minimum spanning tree, etc.). In particular, when applied to combinatorial
optimization problems (see e.g., [16,20]), the VCG mechanisms guarantee the truthfulness
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under the hypothesis that the mechanism is able to compute the optimum and the optimiza-
tion function is utilitarian, that is, the optimization function is equal to the sum of the single
agents’ valuations.
1.2.2.2. Feasible mechanism design. Since for several important optimization problems
it is not possible to compute the optimum in polynomial time, unless P = NP, Nisan and
Ronen [17] focused on the truthfulness of VCG-based mechanism, that is, mechanisms
obtained by replacing, in the VCG ones, the exact algorithm with an approximation one.
They ﬁrst showed that sub-optimal solutions are not suitable because a false declaration
may improve the computed solution and therefore the utility of the agent. In particular,
they deﬁne a class of optimization problems, termed cost minimization allocation problems
(CMAP) and they proved that truthful VCG-based mechanisms compute, for any CMAP
problem, either an optimal solution or a solution arbitrarily far-off the optimum.
To avoid this, they introduce the so called second chance mechanism. For CMAP prob-
lems, second chance mechanisms only guarantee a weaker form of truthfulness.
1.3. Our contribution
Even though the Min-Range(SC) problem is a utilitarian problem (see Eq. (1)), thus
admitting a truthful VCG mechanism, such a mechanism requires the computation of a
minimum-cost solution. The latter problem is NP-hard [7,14], thus implying that the result-
ing VCG mechanism cannot run in polynomial time, unless P = NP.
We investigate the existence of VCG-based truthful mechanisms. The importance of
these mechanisms is twofold: (i) On the one hand, VCG (-based) mechanisms are still the
major technique to derive truthful mechanisms; (ii) on the other hand, real problems require
fast computations of “sufﬁciently good” solutions. The latter goal seems to require truthful
mechanisms since, in our problem, an optimal algorithm running on false costsmay produce
arbitrarily bad solutions.
Our ﬁrst result rules out the possibility of obtaining polynomial-time truthful approxima-
tion VCG-based mechanisms. We indeed show that if a VCG-based mechanism (ALG,P)
for Min-Range(SC) is truthful then it is either optimal or it computes a solution of
cost arbitrarily far off the optimum. So, any polynomial-time truthful mechanism for the
Min-Range(SC) has an unbounded approximation ratio unless P = NP. The proof of
this negative result can also be derived by showing that the Min-Range(SC) is a CMAP
(as mentioned in Section 1.2.2, CMAP problems do not admit truthful VCG-mechanism
[17]). However, this alternative proof is even longer and counterintuitive.
We then consider the special case in which the true agents costs form a metric space
(e.g., stations located on an Euclidean space and  = 1). We ﬁrst observe that our direct
proof of the negative result does not apply to metric instances. This led us to investigate this
important relevant case. We provide a simple truthful VCG-based mechanism that, when
applied to metric instances, returns a constant approximate solution. We emphasize that
even this special case is NP-hard [7] and no efﬁcient truthful mechanism was previously
known.
The algorithm used in our mechanismwas proposed by Calinescu et al. [2]: They showed
that this algorithm guarantees a golden ratio approximation, that is (
√
5+ 1)/2  1.618. In
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this paper, we also improve the analysis of that algorithm by achieving a tight approximation
ratio of 1.5.
We also prove a similar result for the practically relevant case 1 < 2 and well-spread
instances, that is, instances in which stations are located on the plane and any two stations
must not be “too close”.Well-spreadwireless networks have been studied in [5,8,9]. Because
of interference problems, this is the typical situation in radio networks adopted in practice
[15,18] (see Section 3.2.2 for a formal deﬁnition). Observe that these instances are not
metric instances for  > 1: Here the agent costs are proportional to the th power of the
relative distances.
Interestingly, our mechanisms are always truthful and the approximability does not re-
quire the mechanisms to know whether the instance is metric or well-spread. Notice that,
even if the true costs yield a metric or a well-spread instance, the declared costs might not
satisfy any of these properties. However, since our mechanisms are always truthful, agents
are motivated to reveal the truth and so the approximation is guaranteed.
1.3.1. Organization of the paper
In Section 2 we provide the hardness result of the Min-Range(SC) problem for the
general case. In Section 3 we describe the truthful VCG-based mechanism that, for metric
and well-spread instances, guarantees a constant approximation ratio (Section 3.2). Finally,
in Section 4 we discuss some open problems.
1.4. Preliminaries
A mechanism for Min-Range(SC) is a pair (ALG, P ), where ALG is an algorithm that,
on input D, returns a feasible range assignment E = ALG(D) and P = P(D, E) is the
payment vector.
LetD−i denote the vector of declarations of all agents but agent i. Let further 〈D−i;Ci〉
denote the vector D where the declaration of agent i is replaced by Ci . A mechanism
(ALG, P ) is truthful if, for any agent i and for all possible declarations D−i of the other
agents, the corresponding utility
Ui = P i(D, E)− costi (Ci, E), (2)
is maximized when Di = Ci .
Deﬁnition 1. A mechanism (ALG, P ) is called a VCG-based mechanism if the payments
P = 〈P 1, . . . , P n〉
are of the form
P i = −∑
j =i
costj (Dj , E)+ hi(D−i ),
where hi(·) is any function independent of Di .
Intuitively, these mechanisms achieve truthfulness by relating the utility of an agent with
the total cost of the solution chosen by the mechanism: The better the solution the higher
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the utility. In order to formalize this statement let us consider the utility of agent i. From
(2) we get
Ui = P i − costi (Ci, E)
= hi(D−i )− costi (Ci, E)− ∑
j =i
costj (Dj , E)
= hi(D−i )− cost(〈D−i;Ci〉, E).
Since hi(D−i ) is independent of her declarations, agent i tries to minimize
cost(〈D−i;Ci〉, E). Hence, her declaration should be chosen in order to let the algo-
rithm return a solution E˜ which minimizes cost(〈D−i;Ci〉, E). This can be achieved by
declaring the truth, assuming that the mechanism, by using ALG, is able to ﬁnd an optimal
solution E˜.
Deﬁnition 2. Amechanism (ALG, P ) is aVCGmechanism if it is aVCG-based mechanism
and
∀D ALG(D) ∈ argmin
E∈O
(cost(D, E)),
where cost(D, E) =∑ni=1 costi (Di, E) and O is the set of all possible outputs.
Theorem 3 (Groves [12]). VCG mechanisms are truthful.
Finally, let E∗ ∈ argminE∈O(cost(D, E)), we deﬁne opt(D) = cost(D, E∗).
2. VCG-based mechanisms for Min-Range(SC): The hardness result
As mentioned in the Introduction, ﬁnding an optimal solution in polynomial time for the
Min-Range(SC) problem is NP-hard. So, it turns out that efﬁcient mechanisms should
make use of approximating solutions. However, we next show that any reasonable truthful
VCG-based mechanism (see Deﬁnition 1) requires an algorithm that computes an optimal
solution.
A mechanism (ALG, P ) is called degenerate if the approximation ratio produced by ALG
is unbounded, i.e., for any R > 0, there exists a true cost vector C such that
cost(C,ALG(C))
opt(C) R.
Theorem 4. If a VCG-based mechanism (ALG, P ) for Min-Range(SC) is truthful then
it is either optimal or degenerate.
Proof. Let (ALG, P ) be a non-optimal truthful VCG-based mechanism for
Min-Range(SC).Wewill show that it is degenerate. SinceALG is not optimal, there exists
a cost vector C and a communication graphY (i.e., the optimal communication graph) for
which cost(C,ALG(C)) > cost(C,Y).
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Let us deﬁne Cˆ = 〈Cˆ1, . . . , Cˆn〉 where, for any i, j = 1, . . . , n,
Cˆij =
{
Cij if (i, j) ∈Y,
 otherwise, (3)
where  is any positive “large” constant such that  > max{Cij | i, j = 1, . . . , n}. Now, we
construct the following sequence of cost vectors:
S0 = C, S1 = 〈Cˆ1, C2, . . . , Cn〉, . . . , Sn = 〈Cˆ1, . . . , Cˆn〉.
Claim 5. For any z = 0, . . . , n, it holds that cost(S0,Y) = cost(Sz,Y).
Proof. Notice that in Sz, only the values of edges which are not in Y change. Since those
do not inﬂuence the value of cost(Sz,Y), the claim follows. 
The next claim states that the mechanism fails to ﬁnd the optimal solutionY also for the
cost vector Sn.
Claim 6. cost(Sn,ALG(Sn)) > cost(Sn,Y).
Proof. Because ALG is not optimal on C = S0, we have
cost(S0,ALG(S0)) > cost(S0,Y).
We next prove that, for all z = 1, . . . , n
cost(Sz,ALG(Sz))  cost(Sz−1,ALG(Sz))
 cost(Sz−1,ALG(Sz−1)).
The second inequality holds because the mechanism is assumed to be truthful. Indeed, if it
would not hold, agent z would be better off declaring Cˆz instead of Cz. The ﬁrst inequality
holds since, by the choice of , it holds that Sz−1Sz component wise. By combining all
the 2n+ 1 inequalities with Claim 5, we get the thesis. 
Let us now consider the cost vector Sn and the communication graph X = ALG(Sn).
From Claim 6, it follows that X is not optimal and an edge e ∈ X exists which is not
in Y. Indeed, from Eq. (1), if X ⊆ Y then it would hold that cost(D,X)cost(D,Y)
for any D.
Let i be the agent (node) to which e belongs to. Since Cˆ = Sn, the cost of agent i in the
solution X is costi (Cˆi ,X) = . Hence, cost(Sn,ALG(Sn)). From Claim 5, we know
that cost(Sn,Y) does not depend on , thus implying that
cost(Sn,ALG(Sn))
cost(Sn,Y)
is unbounded, so the mechanism is degenerate. 
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3. A truthful mechanism for metric and well-spread instances
In this section, we derive a mechanism for the Min-Range(SC) problem which is
always truthful and it achieves a constant approximation for both metric (i.e.,  = 1)
and well spread-instances. The metric version of the problem will be denoted as
Metric-Min-Range(SC).
The Hub algorithm: The algorithm adopted by our mechanism is simple: It computes a
range assignment that contains a directed minimum spanning tree (of the complete directed
graph induced by the agent declarations) oriented towards a sink node s and all the outgoing
edges from s. Calinescu et al. [2] proved that this Hub algorithm guarantees a performance
ratio of (
√
5+ 1)/2  1.618 for the metric case.
We say that a graph is an hub-tree if it contains a directed spanning tree towards a sink
node s and all outgoing edges from s (Fig. 1).
3.1. A truthful VCG-based mechanism
Let us consider the VCG-based mechanismM = (Hub, P ) where Hub is the algorithm
deﬁned above and P is deﬁned as
P i = −∑
j =i
costj (Dj ,Hub(D)).
Theorem 7. The mechanism M = (Hub, P ) is a truthful mechanism for the
Min-Range(SC) problem.
Proof. Proposition 3.1 in [17] states that aVCG-basedmechanismwith an output algorithm
that is maximal in its range is truthful. Hence the theorem simply follows by observing that
the Hub algorithm computes a hub-tree of minimal cost. 
3.2. The approximation property of the algorithm
In the sequel, thanks to Theorem 7, we will assume that the declared costs induce a
Euclidean instance.
Fig. 1. The Hub algorithm.
C. Ambühl et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 343 (2005) 27–41 37
       c
       c
(a)
(b)
Fig. 2. Worst case for the Hub algorithm.
3.2.1. The metric case
Theorem 8. The Hub algorithm guarantees a 3/2 approximation factor for the
Metric-Min-Range(SC) problem.
It is easy to verify that this bound is tight for the Hub algorithm. Indeed, consider the
instance in Fig. 2: The cost of the optimal solution is cost(C, T )+  (Fig. 2b) whereas the
solution of the Hub algorithm has a cost 32cost(C, T ) (Fig. 2a).
The proof of Theorem 8 needs some preliminary technical results.
Lemma 9. Let C be the agent cost vectors and let wM be the maximum edge-cost of the
minimum spanning tree T . Then it holds that
opt(C)cost(C, T )+ wM.
Proof. Let E∗ be an optimal solution for Metric-Min-Range(SC) and let v be any
station in S. As observed in the analysis of the 2-approximation algorithm in [14], E∗ must
contain a minimum spanning tree T directed towards v. Then
opt(C)cost(C, T )+ cost(Cv, (E∗)v).
Since there exists (at least one) v such that cost(Cv, (E∗)v)wM, then the thesis
holds. 
Deﬁnition 10. The eccentricity of a node v in a connected weighted graphG is the weight
of the maximum among all the shortest paths between v and every other point in G. The
minimum graph eccentricity is called the graph radius. A point v is a central point of a
graph if the eccentricity of the point equals the graph radius. The set of all central points is
called the graph center or, simply, center.
The proof of the following result directly follows from Deﬁnition 10 and from the Hub
algorithm.
Fact 11. The sink agent chosen by the Hub algorithm is a central point of the minimum
undirected spanning tree induced by the agent true costs C.
The following is a classical result in graph theory.
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Theorem 12 (Jordan [13]). In a weighted tree T , with positive weights, the graph center
contains one node or two adjacent nodes.
Proof. The proof follows by observing that the subgraph induced by the graph center of
a weighted graph G is always a clique. This easily implies that the graph center of a tree
contains no more than two vertices. 
A weighted tree is thus denoted as central tree when its center is a single node and as
bi-central tree otherwise.
Lemma 13. Let T be a weighted tree with positive weight function w : T → R+. If R is
the radius of T and wM = maxe∈T w(e) then
Rw(T )+ wM
2
where w(T ) =∑e∈T w(e).
Proof. Let us ﬁrst assume that T is a bi-central tree (see Theorem 12) whose central points
are x and y connected by an edge of weight w(x, y). It is easy to verify that the two paths
Px and Py , that testify the eccentricity of x and y respectively, share only the edge (x, y),
that is
Px ∩ Py = (x, y).
Indeed, this intersection is not-empty (otherwise the eccentricity of x and y would be
w(Px)+ w(x, y) = w(Py)+ w(x, y) > R) and does not contain other edges (because T
is a tree). It thus follows that
w(T )w(Px)+ w(Py)− w(x, y)2R − wM.
Hence, the thesis holds for bi-central trees.
As for central trees, let c be the central point of T and Pc be the path from c that testiﬁes
the eccentricity of c. We claim that there exists (at least) one path P ′c which starts from c,
it is disjoint from Pc, and such that
w(P ′c)+ w(c, x) > w(Pc),
where x belongs to Pc. Indeed, let Px be the path starting from x whose length testiﬁes
the eccentricity of x. Since c is the only central point then w(Px) > w(Pc). Moreover, Px
passes through c because, otherwise,w(Px)w(Pc)−w < w(Pc) (see also Fig. 3). It then
holds that
w(T )w(Pc)+ w(Px)− w(c, x) > 2R − wM
and the thesis follows. 
Proof of Theorem 8. Given any “metric” cost vector C the total cost of Hub(C) satisﬁes
cost(C,Hub(C)) = cost(C, T )+ R.
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Fig. 3. Central tree.
From Fact 11, R is the cost of the sink station then, by combining Lemma 9 and Lemma
13, the thesis follows. 
3.2.2. Well-spread instances
Let us consider the case in which the stations are located on the 2-dimensional Euclidean
space and, for any i, j = 1, . . . , n, it holds thatCij = dist(i, j)2, where dist(i, j) is the
Euclidean distance. This case corresponds to that in which stations lie in the empty space.A






where (S) = min{dist(i, j) | i = j} and diam(S) = max{dist(i, j) | i, j =
1, . . . , n}. Informally speaking, in a well-spread instance, any two stations must be not
“too close”. Because of interference problems, this is the typical situation in radio networks
adopted in practice [15,18].
Theorem 14. The Hub algorithm guarantees a O() approximation ratio for the
Min-Range(SC) problem on well-spread instances.







wherew(T ) denotes the cost of a minimum spanning tree for C. Sincew(T )(n−1)(S)2
and (S)diam(S)/√n, we get
cost(C,Hub(C))
opt(C) = O(). 
4. Conclusions and open problems
In this paper we investigated the existence of truthful VCG-based mechanism for the
Min-Range(SC) problem. We proved that, in general, every polynomial-time truthful
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VCG-based mechanism computes a solution of cost far-off the optimum (unless P=NP)
and that there exists a polynomial-time truthful VCG-based mechanism achieving constant
approximation for metric and well-spread instances.
Several interesting problems related to our results are still open. The most important, in
our opinion, are those listed below.
• The existence of VCG-based mechanisms for the Min-Range(SC) problem restricted
to the case  = 2.
• No result is known concerning mechanism design for the Min-Range() problem
when the property is different from the strong connectivity.We remark that for many of
the these problems the negative result of Theorem4 holds.When the required connectivity
property is a directed spanning tree from a source station (i.e., the broadcast property) the
problem is NP-hard for  > 1 [4] and it is approximable within a constant [1,4]. It is thus
interesting to investigate whether it is possible to derive an approximation VCG-based
mechanism exploiting the results in [1,4].
• In our model the private information of each station is the set of distances with respect to
all other stations. Other reasonable private information can be considered: For instance
we can assume that the protocol has a partial knowledge of the network topology.
• Even though the VCG method is the major technique to obtain truthful mechanism, a
fundamental future research is to develop alternative methods to manage selﬁsh behavior
in the context of energy consumption in wireless networks.
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